[1] Feng, Xin (2024). “Ambiguous Persuasion in Contests.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Volume 220, Pages 182-201.
[2] Feng, Xin, Qian Jiao, Zhonghong Kuang, and Jingfeng Lu (2024). “Optimal Prize Design in Team Contests with Pairwise Battles.” Journal of Economic Theory, 215, 105765.
[3] Agastya, Murali, Xin Feng, and Jingfeng Lu (2023). “Auction Design with Shortlisting When Value Discovery Is Covert.” Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 107, August 2023, 102851
[4] Feng, Xin (2023). “Information Disclosure in All-payAuctions with Costly Entry.” International Journal of Game Theory, 52,401–421.
[5] Lu,Jingfeng, Lixin Ye, and Xin Feng (2021).“Orchestrating Information Acquisition.”American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 13(4): 420–465.
[6] Feng, Xin (2020). “Information Disclosure on the Contest Mechanism.” Journal of Mathematical Economics,91: 148–156.
[7] Feng, Xin, Jingfeng Lu, and Yeneng Sun (2020). “Ex ante Efficient Mechanism with Private Entry.” Economic Inquiry, 58(3): 1531-1541.
[8] Feng, Xin and Jingfeng Lu (2018). “How to Split the Pie: Optimal Rewards in Dynamic Multi-Battle Competitions.” Journal of Public Economics, 160: 82-95.
[9] Feng, Xin and Jingfeng Lu (2017). “Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player,asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power.” Economics Letters, 159: 61-64.
[10] Feng, Xin and Jingfeng Lu (2016). “The Optimal Disclosure Policy in Contests with Stochastic Entry: A Bayesian Persuasion Perspective.” Economics Letters, 147: 103-107.
